Department of Justice Ruby Ridge Report
INTRODUCTION
On Aug. 22, 1992, on a remote ridge in northern Idaho, a weeklong standoff
between Randy Weaver and federal agents ended in a
shootout in which an FBI sniper shot and killed Weaver's wife, Vicky. The
Ruby Ridge confrontation began a week earlier when federal marshals tried to
arrest Weaver for failing to appear in court on weapons charges. At that
time, a gun battle erupted between marshals and Weaver's 14-year-old son,
resulting in the deaths of Weaver's son and a marshal.
The incident led to one of the most intensive internal reviews of an FBI
investigation ever. Attorney General Janet Reno established a Justice
Department task force to investigate the events at Ruby Ridge. The task
force concluded in a 1994 report that the FBI's Hostage Rescue Team
overreacted to the threat of violence and instituted a shoot-on-sight policy
that violated bureau guidelines and Fourth Amendment restrictions on police
power. The FBI disciplined 12 agents and employees, including Larry Potts,
then the head of its criminal division and now its deputy director, for
their roles in the operation.
In the hard copy of this document, some material has been deleted and marked
by the word "Garrity," apparently referring to U.S. Supreme Court opinion
Garrity v. New Jersey (1967). Under Garrity, government employees must be
granted immunity from criminal prosecution if they provide information
during an administrative investigation.
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
A. Overview
In February 1993, the Office of Professional Responsibility ("OPR") of the
U.S. Department of Justice (the "Department") was informed of allegations
made by defense counsel for Randall ("Randy") Weaver and Kevin Harris in the
criminal case of United States v. Weaver which was pending in the federal
district court in Idaho. Defense counsel alleged that employees of several
components of the Department had engaged in criminal and professional
misconduct during the investigation, apprehension, and prosecution of Randy
Weaver and Kevin Harris. The Department decided to defer action on this
matter until the criminal trial was completed.
In July 1993, a jury acquitted Weaver and Harris of charges stemming from
the murder of a federal officer. Following the acquittal, numerous
additional allegations were raised by defense counsel an other sources
against the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms ("BATF"), the U.S.
Marshals Service ("Marshals Service") , the Federal Bureau of Investigation
("FBI" or "Bureau") and the U.S> Attorney's Office for the District of Idaho
("USAO"). Included among these allegations were claims that Department
employees had unlawfully caused the deaths of Sammy and Vicki Weaver, had
taken actions that had obstructed justice, had committed perjury and had
engaged in other criminal and ethical misconduct. In late July 1993,
attorneys from OPR and the Criminal Division of the Department, assisted by
inspectors form the FBI, began an investigation of these allegations.
This report details the results of this investigation and traces
chronologically the events that occurred in the Weaver matter. The early
sections of the report focus on Weaver's sale of illegal firearms to a BATF
informant, BATF's unsuccessful attempt to enlist Weaver as an informant, the
subsequent governmental delay in seeking an indictment on the firearms
violations, and Weaver's arrest on weapons charges followed by his
subsequent failure to appear for trial on those charges. Another area of
investigative inquiry focuses on the efforts of the Marshals Service to
apprehend Weaver. These efforts culminated in the August 21, 1992 gun battle
at Ruby Ridge which took the lives of Deputy Marshal William Degan and
Weaver's son, Sammy Weaver. Next, the report contains a discussion of the
involvement of the FBI in the Weaver matter, including its initial
intervention in the crisis, its responsibility for the death of Vicki Weaver
and wounding of Kevin Harris on August 22, 1992, its handling of the crisis
including its attempts to end the week-long standoff, its handling of the
crime scene searches and its subsequent activities in assisting the USAO in
preparing the Weaver case for trial. Finally, the last section of the report
addresses the handling by the USAO and the investigative agencies of the
prosecution of Weaver and Harris including representation made by the U.S.
Attorney to the court prior to the beginning of Harris' preliminary hearing,
the conduct of the Assistant U.S. Attorney before the grand jury and the
untimely disclosure of critical information to the defense.
We found that many of the allegations of misconduct were not supported by
the evidence. However, we did find merit in some of the more serious
charges. As a result, we have asked that the appropriate component of the
Department examine for prosecutive merit the conduct of the FBI
sniper/observer who fired the shots on August 22, 1992. In addition, because
our investigation indicated that Assistant U.S. Attorney Ronald Howen took
certain questionable actions during the investigation and prosecution of the
Weaver case, we have recommended that the Executive Office for United States
Attorneys examine our analysis of his conduct and take whatever
administrative action it deems appropriate. Finally, we have formulated a
series of recommendations that address the problems that we reviewed or
uncovered during our investigation.
B. Significant Findings
In October 1989, Randy Weaver sold illegal weapons to a BATF informant. When
BATF agents later attempted to enlist Weaver as an informant in their
investigation of the Aryan Nations, Weaver refused to cooperate. Seven
months later, the government indicted Weaver for the illegal weapons sales.
We have found no evidence to support the claim that BATF targeted Weaver
because of his religious or political beliefs. Similarly, we found
insufficient evidence to sustain the charge that Weaver was illegally
entrapped into selling the weapons.
When Weaver was arraigned on the weapons charges in January 1991, he was
told that his trial would commence on February 19, 1991. Two weeks later,
the court clerk notified the parties that the trial date had been changed to
February 20, 1991. Shortly thereafter, the U.S. Probation Office sent Weaver
a letter which incorrectly referenced his trial date as March 20, 1991.
After Weaver failed to appear for trial on February 20, the court issued a
bench warrant for his arrest. Three weeks later, on March 14, a federal
grand jury indicted Weaver for his failure to appear for trial. We found
that: the government, especially the USAO, was unnecessarily rigid in its
approach to the issues created by the erroneous letter; that the USAO
improvidently sought an indictment before March 20, 1991;
[G.J.]
From February 1991 through August 1992, the Marshals Service was involved in
efforts to apprehend Weaver to stand trial for the weapons charges and for
his failure to appear fortrial. These efforts included gathering information
about Weaver and developing a plan to arrest him. Base on information that
it collected, the Marshals Service learned that for many years Weaver had
made statements about his intent to violently confront federal law
enforcement officials. As a result, the Marshals Service concluded that
Weaver intended to resist violently governmental attempts to arrest him.
Thereafter, the Marshals Service investigated and carefully considered
alternatives that would enable it to arrest Weaver without endangering his
family or law enforcement personnel. It concluded that an undercover
operation would be the most prudent way to proceed.
In August 1992, six marshals travelled to an area in northern Idaho known as
Ruby Ridge to conduct surveillance of the Weaver residence in preparation
for the undercover operation. During the surveillance mission, the Weaver
dog discovered the marshals and began to bark. The marshals retreated with
the dog, Harris, Randy Weaver and his son, Sammy Weaver, and other family
members in pursuit. At an area known as the "Y," a gun battle occurred in
which Deputy Marshal Degan and Sammy Weaver were killed.
We conclude that the marshals took a measured approach in developing a plan
to apprehend Weaver. Throughout the 18 month period that the marshals were
responsible for apprehending Weaver, they carefully devised a plan intended
to pose the least amount of risk to Weaver, his family, and the marshals. At
no time did we find that it was the intent of the marshals to force a
confrontation with Weaver or his family. Although some may question the
expenditures of manpower and resources by the Marshals Service during this
18 month period, we believe that institutional pressure created by the
existence of a bench warrant and an indictment, left the Marshals Service
with little choice but to proceed as it did. Moreover, the USAO did little
to assist the Marshals Service in this matter. Indeed, during the first part
of this process the USAO thwarted the efforts of the Director of the
Marshals Service to focus the court on the danger involved in making the
arrest and incorrectly terminated efforts by the Marshals Service to
negotiate with Weaver through intermediaries.
With regard to the responsibility for the deaths that occurred at the Y, the
marshals assert that Harris initiated the fire fight when he shot Deputy
Marshal Degan while Weaver and Harris claim that the marshals fired the
first shots. After a thorough review of all of the evidence made available
to us, we have been unable to determine conclusively who fired the first
shot during the exchange of gunfire. Although there is evidence that one of
the marshals shot Sammy Weaver during the exchange of gunfire, we found no
proof that the shooting of the boy was anything other than an accident. In
fact, the evidence indicates that the marshals did not know that Sammy
Weaver had been killed or wounded until his body was discovered by the FBI
in a shed outside the Weaver cabin two days later. Nor did wediscover any
evidence indicating that the marshals attempted to cover up their roles in
the incident or that they exaggerated the events to cause a more drastic FBI
response than was appropriate.
Soon after learning of the August 21 incident at Ruby Ridge, the FBI
officials in Washington, D.C. evaluated the information made available to
them and decided to deploy its Hostage Rescue Team ("HRT") to Idaho to deal
with the crisis. HRT members assumed their position around the Weaver
compound late in the afternoon of August 22, 1992 but before doing so they
were instructed that their conduct was to be governed by specially
formulated Rules of Engagement ("Rules"). These Rules instructed the HRT
snipers that before a surrender announcement was made they could and should
shoot all armed adult males appearing outside the cabin. Operating under
these Rules on August 22, an FBI sniper/observer fired two shots in quick
succession. The first shot was at an armed adult male whom he believed was
about to fire at a HRT helicopter on an observation mission. The first shot
wounded Randy Weaver while in front of a building at the Weaver compound
known as the birthing shed. The second shot was fired at Harris while Harris
was retreating into the Weaver cabin. The second shot seriously wounded
Harris and killed Vicki Weaver who was behind the cabin door.
Following this shooting incident FBI officials spent the next eight days
attempting to convince Weaver and Harris to surrender to federal
authorities. Finally, due largely to the efforts of nongovernmental
negotiators, Harris and Weaver surrendered on August 30 and August 31
respectively. Thereafter, the FBI completed its searches of the cabin and
surrounding areas. During the following month, the FBI also conducted an
internal review of the shooting incident to determine if the sniper had
responded appropriately.
Our review found numerous problems with the conduct of the FBI at Ruby
Ridge. Although we concluded that the decision to deploy the HRT to Ruby
Ridge was appropriate and consistent with Department policy, we do not
believe that the FBI's initial attempts at intelligence gathering at the
scene were sufficiently thorough. We also found serious problems with the
terms of the Rules of Engagement in force at Ruby Ridge. Certain portions of
these Rules not only departed from the FBI's standard deadly force policy
but also contravened the Constitution of the United States. In addition, we
found these Rules to be imprecise and believe that they may have created an
atmosphere that encouraged the use of deadly force thereby having the effect
of contributing to an unintentional death.
With regard to the two shots fired on August 22, we concluded that the first
shot met the standard of "objective reasonableness" the Constitution
requires for the legal use of deadly force but that the second shot did not
satisfy that standard. It is our conclusion that the sniper/observer who
took the second shot intended to shoot Kevin Harris but accidentally killed
Vicki Weaver whom he did not see behind the curtained door. We also found
the internal FBI review of the shooting incident has not been sufficiently
thorough and reached incorrect conclusions about the second shot.
Our examination of the command and control of the crisis by the FBI, found
numerous shortcomings. These shortcomings included initial inadequacies in
utilizing negotiating personnel, communicating with FBI Headquarters,
documenting decisions and securing the site.
During and after the crisis, the crime scenes were searched by many law
enforcement officials under the direct supervision of the FBI. We found the
FBI's handling of the crime scene searches to be inadequate including its
failure to use basic crime scene techniques in collecting evidence.
Furthermore, the general disorganization and inexperience of some of the
participants coupled with inaccuracies in the searches adversely affected
the prosecution and contributed to the negative impression of the government
generated during the trial. We found no evidence that these deficiencies
were intentional or that the FBI staged evidence for the prosecution's
benefit.
Shortly after their arrest, separate preliminary hearings were held for
Weaver and Harris. While arguing the government's motion requesting a
continuance of the Harris preliminary hearing, U.S. Attorney Ellsworth made
statements indicating that the government would allow Harris to have a
complete preliminary hearing in return or consenting to the continuance.
Thereafter, Harris consented to the continuance with the understanding that
he would have a full preliminary hearing. An indictment was returned against
Harris while his preliminary hearing was in progress. We have found that the
U.S. Attorney did not intentionally misrepresent the government's position
but that he failed to appreciate the impact of his statements and that he
neglected to pay sufficient attention to the information that the received
concerning the probably length of the preliminary hearing.
After the first indictments were returned against Weaver and Harris, the
Assistant U.S. Attorney continued to present evidence to the grand jury
which led to the return of two superseding indictments, each containing a
conspiracy count. We found these conspiracy counts to be overly broad and to
contain some overt acts for which there was insufficient evidence.
[G.J.]
Later the USAO decided to seek the death penalty against Weaver and Harris
even though the applicable federal appellate court had held that the offense
charged could not constitutionally support the imposition of a death
sentence. We have concluded that the decision to seek the death penalty,
although made in good faith, gave the appearance that the government was
overreaching.
From the moment that the USAO began to prepare the case for trial, it met
with resistance from the FBI. This resistance took many forms, all of which
served to make preparation of the case more difficult. The FBI continuously
opposed actions of the prosecutors requested to prepare the case for trial,
ranging from having the case agents conduct out-of state interviews to
enlisting agents from other agencies to help prepare the case. The FBI,
which wanted to be the only agency or, at a minimum, the lead agency on the
case, resisted working as a coequal member of the prosecution team.
Furthermore, when the USAO sought advice and assistance from the FBI
Laboratory they met with unjustified delays and resistance that created
discord within the team and disrupted trial preparation. These problems
contributed to the USAO's decision to retain private forensic experts.
In addition, the FBI unjustifiably delayed producing materials to the USAO
that were needed for trial preparation and that were clearly discoverable
under federal law and the discovery stipulation signed by the parties. This
action unreasonably delayed the availability of these materials for trial
preparation and for discovery. Particularly at the headquarters level, we
found that the FBI's efforts to locate and produce discoverable documents to
be disorganized and incomplete. The late production during trial of
materials associated with the FBI Shooting Incident Report negatively
affected the court's and the jury's perception of the government and the
government's case. In addition, the delays in discovery caused by the
disorganization of and mistakes committed by the FBI Laboratory contributed
to the delay of the trial and to the perception that the government was
uncooperative and not being totally forthcoming.
However, the FBI was not alone in failing to make timely disclosure of
critical information to the defense. The USAO was also responsible for not
promptly revealing certain important information to the defense. Although in
some instances we found these tardy disclosures to be unjustified or
negligent, we do not believe that they were improperly motivated or taken
intentionally to obstruct the Weaver trial.
C. Significant Recommendations
As the result of our investigation, we have made seven broad
recommendations. First, we recommend that all federal law enforcement
officers be governed by a standard deadly force policy and that the
Department of Justice be responsible for developing such a policy. in
addition to specifying clearly the circumstances in which deadly force may
be used, the policy should define the occasions in which special Rules of
Engagement may be implemented and the process by which such rules should be
approved.
Second, we recommend that a crisis response team, including specially
trained crisis managers, be available to respond to crises. In addition, we
endorse the proposal to include specially trained prosecutors to provide
legal support to tactical teams when needed. We also propose periodic joint
training exercises by the various federal and local law enforcement agencies
which are responsible for responding to crisis situation.
Third, we recommend that a panel comprised of representatives from federal
law enforcement agencies, including an attorney form the Department of
Justice, be created to examine the internal reviews that law enforcement
agencies conduct after shooting incidents occur. This examination would
focus on the thoroughness and prosecutive merit of the internal review.
Fourth, we recommend that FBI field offices that do not have a team in place
to recover evidence after major hostage/barricade crises like Ruby Ridge
request the assistance of the Evidence Response Team at FBI Headquarters. We
further recommend that procedures be adopted to improve the coordination
between the FBI Laboratory and the federal prosecutors and that an
examination be done of the FBI procedures regarding the memorializing of
interviews.
Sixth, we recommend that all U.S. Attorneys' Offices institute a review
process for indictments, at least for significant cases.
Finally, we recommend that our findings concerning the events surrounding
the shooting of Vicki Weaver on August 22, 1992 be referred to the
appropriate component of the Department of Justice to assess prosecutive
merit. In addition, we recommend that our analysis of the conduct of
Assistant U.S. Attorney Ronald Howen be referred to the Executive Office for
United States Attorneys for whatever administrative action it deems
appropriate.